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“SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED”
REVERSAL OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
John V. Orth*
Abstract
This Article considers the way in which small changes of wording can
signal large changes of thought in the United States Constitution
(Constitution). Drawing upon examples found in the Eleventh and
Sixteenth Amendments, and in the Reconstruction Amendments, the
Article shows that there are two ways to reverse a U.S. Supreme Court
decision by constitutional amendment. The first type of amendment may
reverse the decision by instructing the Court on the proper construction
of a particular provision, as in the case of the Eleventh Amendment. The
second means involves reversing the decision by altering the
constitutional provision in question, rather than its construction, as by the
Sixteenth Amendment.
Changed wording can even reflect changes in the understanding of the
federal union. In the Constitution, as it was reported out of the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia on September 17, 1787, the
name of the new nation was consistently construed as a plural noun. In
Article I: “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States; and
no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
the Consent of the Congress, accept of any Present, Emolument, Office,
or Title, of any Kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”1
In Article II: “The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his
Services a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased [sic] nor
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and
he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the
United States, or any of them.”2 And in Article III: “Treason against the
United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”3
The “United States” was construed as a plural noun through 1865 and
the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment: “Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.”4 But three years later in the first
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, the plural number was carefully
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of
Law, A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §1.
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avoided: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.”5 And, in contrast to the wording of the
Treason Clause in Article III, the plural number is also avoided in the
third section of the Fourteenth Amendment: “No person shall be a
Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and VicePresident, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof.”6 Something similar occurs in the Fifteenth
Amendment. Rather than referring to actions by “the United States or any
of them,” as in the text of Article II, the 1870 Amendment provides: “The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.”7
In no succeeding amendment is the United States construed as a plural
noun. The wording of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 repeats the
usage of the Fourteenth, rather than that of the Thirteenth Amendment,
when referring to the territories of the United States: “After one year from
the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.”8 Today,
of course, United States is “a noun plural in number but usually singular
in construction.”9 The grammatical shift reflects the reality created by the
Union victory in the Civil War and the consolidation of national power.
Proper construction, in a different sense, is addressed by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1795: “The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. It is also noteworthy that, in contrast to the wording of
Article II, the Amendment refers to persons holding office under “the United States, or under any
State,” rather than under “the United States, or any of them”; and, in contrast to the wording of
Article III, it refers to “insurrection or rebellion against the same,” rather than insurrection or
rebellion “against them.”
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
9. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 2501 (“n pl but usu sing in constr”) (1971).
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State.”10 As is well known, the Amendment was adopted to overturn the
result in Chisholm v. Georgia.11 In Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina
sued Georgia in assumpsit to recover on a debt.12 Georgia denied the
Court’s jurisdiction and refused to appear.13 At issue was the
constitutional grant of federal jurisdiction over suits against states in
Article III: “The judicial power shall extend … to Controversies …
between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another
State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and Foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”14
Of the five Justices who heard the case,15 four upheld the jurisdiction
of the Court and ruled in favor of Chisholm, each explaining in detail the
reasons for his decision. All four—who had either signed the Constitution
at Philadelphia (Justices John Blair and James Wilson) or had supported
the original text at their state ratifying conventions (Chief Justice John
Jay and Justice William Cushing), or both (Justices Blair and Wilson)—
construed the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over suits “between a
State and Citizens of another State” to cover Chisholm’s suit against
Georgia. Only one Justice dissented. While acknowledging that the
wording of Article III could cover the suit, Justice James Iredell pointed
out that the constitutional grant of federal jurisdiction does not specify
what types of actions against states are included.16 Since the common law
did not recognize actions in assumpsit against the Crown,17 and the
10. Confusion exists about the correct date of the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.
The difficulty stems from the fact that President John Adams proclaimed the ratification of the
Amendment on January 8, 1798, and for most of the Amendment’s long history that has been the
date given for its effectiveness, but the Amendment had actually attained the necessary number
of state ratifications by February 7, 1795, during the presidency of George Washington. Two
annotated editions of the Constitution, both published in 2009, illustrate the point. SETH LIPSKY,
THE CITIZEN’S CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE 245 (2009) (Eleventh Amendment ratified
1798); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION & DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
245 (2009) (Eleventh Amendment ratified 1795).
11. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1793). See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12–20 (1987).
12. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420.
13. Id. at 469.
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
15. Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for six Justices of the Supreme Court, the
sixth seat was vacant at the time of the Chisholm case. On the development of the modern
expectation that multi-member appellate courts require an odd number of Justices, see John V.
Orth, How Many Judges Does It Take to Make a Supreme Court? 19 CONST. COMMENT. 681, 681
(2002).
16. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 427.
17. Actions to recover property from the Crown were instituted not by the common law
action of assumpsit but by petition of right, a proceeding in equity which adjudicated “as a matter
of grace, though not upon compulsion.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
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Judiciary Act of 1789 did not specifically provide for such actions against
a state, he would have dismissed the suit. In the last paragraph of his
twenty-one-page opinion he ventured what he called an “extra-judicial”
doubt about whether even Congress could permit a “compulsive suit
against a State for the recovery of money.”18
Over the years since the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, much
has been made of the phrase “shall not be construed.” The Supreme Court
has interpreted the phrase to mean that the Amendment was intended to
restore the original understanding of the grant of federal jurisdiction
rather than to alter or amend the text.19 In consequence, a state can sue a
citizen of another state in federal court but, but the state cannot be sued
in federal court—at least, not without its consent.20 More significantly,
the phrase has been used as evidence to support the conclusion that the
states did not surrender their sovereign immunity by ratifying the
Constitution. 21
Not generally noticed is that correction of a mistaken construction,
whether of a constitution or a statute, is characteristic of a decision by an
appellate court overturning a decision of a lower court. Had the
Constitution provided for appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court
to the Congress, a decision overturning Chisholm would have included
instructions concerning the correct construction of the constitutional
grant of jurisdiction. Appeal from a court to the legislature would not
have surprised eighteenth-century Americans, who had been familiar
with the English practice of appeal to the House of Lords.22 Considered
in this light, the Eleventh Amendment resembles the reversal of a judicial
decision, rather than the amendment of a text. Furthermore, like a
reversal, the Amendment has retrospective effect, applying to suits like
Chisholm that had been “commenced” before its adoption and that could
not be “prosecuted” thereafter.23

OF ENGLAND

*236 (David Lemmings ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1765); see also 3 id. *256–
57 (1768).
18. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449–50 (Iredell, J., dissenting). For more on Iredell’s
dissent, see John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia
(1793), 73 N.C. L. REV. 255 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890); Orth, supra note 11 at 22.
20. How a defendant state can consent to suit in federal court when the Eleventh
Amendment expressly states that federal judicial power “shall not be construed to extend” to such
a suit has never been adequately explained. See Orth, supra note 11 at 123–24.
21. Orth, supra note 11 at 151.
22. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 454–55 (1768). New York until 1846
allowed appeal from the state Supreme Court to the Court for the Correction of Errors, composed
of the entire New York Senate, augmented by the state’s Chancellor and the Justices of the state
Supreme Court. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, § 32; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. V, § 1.
23. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI.

118

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

A century after the decision in Chisholm, the Supreme Court decided
another case that was subsequently overturned by constitutional
amendment.24 In 1895, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co.,25 the Court
held the recently adopted federal income tax unconstitutional.26 Finding
a tax on incomes to be a direct tax, the Court held that it had to be
apportioned among the states as required by the Direct Tax Clause of the
Constitution: “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken.”27 In response, the Sixteenth Amendment, adopted in 1913,
provided express constitutional authorization for a tax on incomes: “The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”28
Originally argued before eight Justices, Pollock resulted in an equal
division on one aspect of the case and required a rehearing before all nine
Justices for a final decision.29 The Justice who had been unable to attend
the first hearing attended the second and voted in favor of the
constitutionality of the disputed aspect of the tax, but an unidentified
Justice changed his vote at the second hearing, causing the entire tax to
fail.30 Ever since, scholarly discussion concerning Pollock has focused on
the unfortunate procedural history of the case31 and on the Court’s
questionable construction of the constitutional phrase “direct tax.”32
Progressive circles denounced the Court for its adoption of laissez-faire
24. During the hundred years after Chisholm, the Fourteenth Amendment, which granted
citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, overturned one aspect of the
Court’s decision in the Dred Scott case. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)
(enslaved party) superseded by constitutional amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Because the invalidation of the federal income tax
required two Supreme Court decisions, Pollock is sometimes referred to as the Income Tax Cases
(in the plural) although it was in fact only one case.
26. 158 U.S. at 637.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. See also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct
Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers . . . .”).
28. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVI.
29. The Court divided the law into three parts: a tax on income from state and municipal
bonds, a tax on income from real property, and a tax on income from personal property. 157 U.S.
at 586. At the first hearing, the Court held the tax on income from state and municipal bonds and
the tax on income from real property unconstitutional but was unable to decide on the
constitutionality of the tax on income from personal property. Id.
30. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (1936).
31. Charles Evans Hughes later described Pollock—along with the Dred Scott Case, 60
U.S. 393 (1857), and the Legal Tender Cases, 75 U.S. 603 (1870), 79 U.S. 457 (1871), both of
which also had awkward procedural histories—as one of the Court’s three “self-inflicted
wounds.” HUGHES, supra note 27 at 50–54.
32. ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR
AND BENCH, 1887–1895 at 165–66 (1960).
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constitutionalism, a view shared by one of the dissenting Justices, who
declared from the bench that “[t]he practical effect of the decision to-day
is to give to certain kinds of property a position of favoritism and
advantage . . . .”33
Otherwise unnoticed is that the Sixteenth Amendment did not attempt
to correct the Court’s construction of the Direct Tax Clause.34 Rather than
provide that the Direct Tax Clause “shall not be construed to extend to
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration,” the Amendment in effect conceded the correctness of the
Court’s construction of the text as originally adopted.35 By changing the
text rather than the construction of the text, the Sixteenth Amendment
defers construction to the Court, relying on it to construe the new text in
accordance with its plain meaning.
*

*

*

As demonstrated by the Eleventh and Sixteenth Amendments, there
are two ways to reverse a Supreme Court decision by constitutional
amendment. The amendment may reverse the decision by instructing the
Court on the proper construction of the particular provision, as by the
Eleventh Amendment. Or the amendment may reverse the decision by
altering the constitutional provision in question, rather than its
construction, as by the Sixteenth Amendment.36 Although the Eleventh
Amendment corrected the Court’s construction of the Constitution, it
“[p]erhaps . . . inadvertently foreshadowed the means by which the law
of the Constitution was largely to be developed over the ensuing
centuries—judicial . . . construction, subject only to occasional correction
by formal amendment.”37
Over the hundred years that separated the Eleventh and the Sixteenth
Amendments, it came to be accepted that instructing the Court
concerning the proper construction of the Constitution was out of keeping
with the American concept of separation of powers.38 Constructions of
33. 158 U.S. at 685 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Paul, supra note 23.
34. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVI.
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVI (emphasis added).
37. See John V. Orth et al., No Amendment? No Problem: Judges, “Informal Amendment,”
and the Evolution of Constitutional Meaning in the Federal Democracies of Australia, Canada,
India, and the United States, 48 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 341, 365 (2021).
38. Instructions as to proper construction did not cease altogether. The Seventeenth
Amendment (1913), providing for the direct election of Senators, included an instruction on the
effect of the Amendment on Senators chosen before its adoption: “This amendment shall not be
so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as
part of the Constitution.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVII (emphasis added). By contrast, the TwentySecond Amendment (1951), limiting presidential terms, provides simply that “this article shall
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the text are for the Court. Mistaken constructions are corrected by
alterations of the text. Just as the change from construing the United
States as a plural noun to construing it as a singular noun signaled a new
understanding of the nature of the Union, so the change in the language
of amendment signaled a new understanding of the proper roles of the
Court and constitutional amendments.

not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the
Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting
as President, during the term within which this article becomes operative from holding the office
of President, or acting as President, during the . . . remainder of such term,” rather than providing
that the amendment shall not be construed to apply to such persons. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XXII, §
1.

